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The Olympic Class:
The Politics Behind the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Games
Michelle Lacoss
History 4990, Dr. Larry Youngs
May 1, 2009
 Olympese is the official Olympic rhetoric that rises like a vapor over Switzerland, sounds 
 better in French than in English and is mouthed painfully by Billy Payne...Otherwise 
 intelligent people talk about complicated human events (which are, naturally, full of 
 commerce, failure, nationalism, even lies) entirely in terms of excellence, humanity, 
 beauty, spirit, etc.1
 -Colin Campbell, Atlanta Journal-Constitution
 To promote Atlanta as an international city worthy of attaining the 1996 Atlanta 
Centennial Olympics, Atlanta’s regime of public and private city leaders did not create a single 
image of Atlanta.  Rather, they maintained ambiguous and contradictory myths to appeal to 
various audiences, regionally and internationally.  The commercial power of the Olympics as a 
municipal investment between the public and private sectors was proven possible with the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympics and provided a template for the Atlanta Olympic Committee (“AOC”).2  
To achieve their projected financial goals, Atlanta expected to take revenue generation to new 
heights and reach a broader audience.  The Atlanta Committee of the Olympic Games (“ACOG”) 
asserted that the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Games (“Games”) would reach 
unprecedented levels in audience size through television and technology to entice corporate 
sponsors to support them with sponsorship agreements and dollars.3  
 Critics claim that ACOG struggled with defining Atlanta’s image.  When the image was 
revealed as a mascot in the form of a little blue “creature from outer space” named “WhatIzIt,” 
later morphing into “Izzy,” the response at home and abroad was anything but positive.4  Why 
did Olympic planners maintain a mascot so ridiculed and reviled?  Planners thought this little 
2
1 Colin Campbell, “Bye-Bye, Olympese,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 6, 1996, C1:1.
2 Drew Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 24, no. 4 (December 2000): 802; Harvey K. Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of 
Atlanta (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 256.
3 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, The Unprecedented Opportunity of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic 
Games and the 1994 and 1996 U.S. Olympic Teams (Atlanta: Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, 1991), 46.
4 “Mr. Olympics’ Still a Minister,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 22, 1996, SS:28.
spermatozoa with two rings on his eyes and three on his tail provided the opportunity to embrace 
the ambiguities in the many contradictory perceptions of Atlanta, hoping to capitalize on all 
facets of these contradictions while ensuring there is no image of alienation.
“Izzy in Costume.” 5
 Scholarly work within this area argues that Atlanta hid behind an image of integration 
and falsehoods6.  Charles Rutheiser, for instance, points out the myths of Atlanta as a city of the 
“New New South” in Imagineering Atlanta, focusing on a reworking of the boosterism of the 
“New South” and modernizing the concept by incorporating racial integration and harmony as 
the home to Martin Luther King, Jr. and a “Black Mecca.”7  This paper chooses to focus not on 
boosterism or the white business elite, but argues how influential African-American politicians 
worked in conjunction with the elite white in power to create an economic dynamic that would 
win the Olympic bid for Atlanta in 1988, and carry it through until certain truths were exposed in 
the 1999 Salt Lake City “bribery scandal.”  While the image that Atlanta portrayed during the 
3
5 Los Angeles Newspaper Group, “Izzy,” Los Angeles Newspaper Group Web site, JPG file, http://
www.insidesocal.com/ tv/olympics-mascot-izzy.jpg (accessed April 29, 2009).
6 Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 805.  Whitelegg argues of the inconsistencies endemic 
within Atlanta defined as “‘the city too busy to hate’ (its ‘claim to fame’ from the late 1950s)...and that of Atlanta, 
‘home of the Ku Klux Klan.’”  He further claims that ACOG intentionally tried to avoid references to Gone with the 
Wind which seem unsubstantiated.  
7 Charles Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams (New York: Verso, 1996), 3.
Games represents a snapshot, it espoused the long-held faith among key political figures in 
corporate dominance and aspirations for economic affluence through sport.  Neighborhoods were 
wiped out not based on the fact that they were predominately African-American, but that they 
happened to sit in the way of “progress,” while neighborhood leaders lacked the financial esteem 
or political influence to make their voices heard.  According to regime theory, “policy inertia” is 
thwarted through urban regimes, defined as, 
 ...an informal coalition between local business leaders and city officials that unites the 
 resources of business with the formal authority of government to carry out policies of 
 mutual interest, most commonly economic development.8
Chaired by former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young, affluent, connected African-American and 
white political and business leaders who made up the Atlanta Games Regime determined the 
process together. 
 When Andrew Young and Maynard Jackson fought for an end to racism during the Civil 
Rights Movement, both Atlanta visionaries understood that the fight was made possible not only 
by appealing to the moral compass of those in power, but also through economic means.  The 
economic boycotts and marches led by the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) became an impetus for change.  In 1996, Mayor Maynard Jackson stated that, “When 
Birmingham had fire hoses and cattle prods in the street, Atlanta went to the bargaining table.  
We knew that cattle prods are bad for business.”9  Furthermore, the argument of trade disruption 
4
8 Matthew J. Burbank, Greg Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public 
Policy,” The Review of Policy Research 19, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 184.
9 As quoted by Paul Goldberger, “Atlanta Is Burning?” New York Times, June 23, 1996, SM:52.
and loss in tourism dollars from the segregated African-American traveler was made in 1964, 
encouraging Johnson and congressional leaders to enact legislation to end discrimination.10
 Consistent with his reverence toward capitalism as a solution, Mayor Andrew Young, as 
Mayor Maynard Jackson’s first-term successor, saw the potential in the 1996 Atlanta Centennial 
Olympic Games to revitalize Atlanta economically and, possibly, solve the concentrated poverty 
problem within the public housing complexes, such as Techwood Homes or Clark Howell 
Homes.11  What was created through racism would be redefined through classism.  Urban 
renewal within the downtown Atlanta core and concentrations of poverty and crime within the 
African-American public housing complexes were considerations for Mayor Maynard Jackson to 
revitalize in the 1970s and early 1980s.  However, this time Jackson’s suggested solutions rested 
with policies such as affirmative action.12  With President Reagan’s 1984 elimination of several 
federal aid programs geared toward urban policy, cities were required to look elsewhere for 
funding and, for Atlanta, the Games provided the perfect economic impetus to focus on the 
revitalization of downtown Atlanta.13  Contemporary public policy strategies include the 
promotion of tourism to “justify” local development and mega-events such as the Olympics 
provided such a promotional outlet, reaching a broader audience than otherwise possible.14  
5
10 Susan Sessions Rugh, Are We There Yet? The Golden Age of American Family Vacations (Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 2008), 90.  This golden age refers to the defining of the ideal nuclear family as a white, 
patriarchal family structure with dad making the decisions; reinforced by automobile advertisements and guide 
books that portray gender and racial stereotypes.  Rugh touches on the subject of the African-American middle class 
family and the complexity of their situation.  She explains how consumerism, and the “grounds that segregated 
facilities disrupted trade,” ultimately provided the impetus for greater Civil Rights legislation under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. 
11 Harvey K. Newman, The Atlanta Housing Authority’s Olympic Legacy Program: Public Housing Projects to 
Mixed Income Communities (Atlanta, GA: Research Atlanta, April 2002), 10.
12 Ibid.; Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 805.
13 Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” 182;  Larry Keating, 
A City for All: A Report (Atlanta: Atlanta City Council Gentrification Task Force, 2001), 1.
14 Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” 180.
During the planning process of the Games, then Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young summed up his 
philosophy on public policy toward this mega-event: “the commercialization of sport is the 
democratization of sport.”15
 In voicing his support of the development of the Georgia Dome as an opportunity to 
retain the Atlanta Falcons and for hosting future events, one member of the Atlanta Games 
Regime who dominated the Games planning, Billy Payne, stated that, “the Olympics eventually 
comes down to money.”16  Succumbing to economic bullying by sports franchises who threaten 
to leave and hosting sporting events of the caliber of the Olympics both served to promote an 
image of a “major league city” or “international city” with relatively small immediate returns.17  
While the financial cost of pursuing such events was considerable, the recognition and marketing 
attained served as justification for entering the race.18  The economic failure of the publicly 
funded Montreal Olympics in 1976 precipitated the change to include private enterprise in the 
process, as seen with the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.19  The Atlanta Games Regime 
exploited the opportunity seen within Los Angeles’ example and was rewarded by the 
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) for the amount of private support garnered.20  
6
15 As quoted by Christopher R. Hill, Olympic Politics (New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 1996), 243.  
Citation of this quote not provided by author.  Based on context within Olympic Politics, this author assumes this 
quote was made during the planning process of the Games.
16 “Supplement,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 17, 1988, D:42.
17 Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” 183-184.
18 Ibid., 180; Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 802.
19 Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 802; John Bevilaqua, “Commentary,” Atlanta Journal- 
Constitution, April 17, 1988, E4:1.
20 Robert Knight Barney, Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic 
Commercialism  (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2002), 250.
WhatIzImage?
 Various images of Atlanta worked to sell the city to different regional and international 
interest groups.  Initially created by Atlanta boosters as a transportation and commerce hub, 
Atlanta had struggled in recent decades to create itself as a tourist destination to generate 
revenue.21  The lack of downtown tourist attractions and poverty did not aid in this struggle.  In 
preparation for the Games, Atlanta not only had to define itself through an advertising hook but it 
had to create the infrastructure to support that hook.
 One approach included the theme of “southern hospitality” that prevailed in many 
publications, including the official bid and sales circulars for promoting the Games to sponsors.22  
“Southern hospitality” presented a problem in that it is a cultural signifier for the region, not 
particular to Atlanta.  While it has cache and was referred to at times by Games planners, the 
notion that everyone in the city is nice does not lend for a strong marketing campaign.  “Southern 
hospitality” is meant to signify an all-embracing spirit toward others where truth rests within 
polite, sometimes evasive terms.  It evokes uncertain calm and represents a lack of conflict 
through passive-aggressiveness.  Building a marketing platform on the idea of a “conflict-free” 
environment can be problematic:  “One is its skewed version of history, as though conflict, 
negotiation, struggle and controversy are somehow anathema to progress when in actual fact they 
are often its lifeblood.  The other...is its reliance on  image ‘management.’  Images cannot be 
controlled.”23
7
21 Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 277.
22 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, The Unprecedented Opportunity of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic 
Games and the 1994 and 1996 U.S. Olympic Teams, 21.
23 Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 810.
 “Southern hospitality” might have been attributed to Atlanta, but an actual image in the 
form of a marketing tag line for Atlanta was never able to come to fruition.24  Neither ACOG, 
Atlanta residents nor Atlanta politicians could come to agree on the one theme to embrace once 
the Games were awarded, with meetings held between key public and private agencies to create 
one slogan to no avail.25  Some options incorporated by various agencies include:  “Come 
Celebrate our Dream,” “Look at Atlanta Now,” “Atlanta: What the World is Coming to,” and 
“Atlanta:  Hometown to the American Dream.”
 Evidence supports that Olympic planners appreciated the stock of its many, often 
contradictory, images.  While scholars argue that the lack of definition within “Izzy” as the 
Games mascot represented Atlanta’s own identity crisis, the lack of specificity intended the 
necessary ambiguities to appeal to a broad audience and subsequently give rise to the possible 
increase in economic potential and viewership.26  Charles Rutheiser asserts that “Atlanta’s most 
appreciated and defining characteristic seemed its ability to morph, to reconfigure itself in 
response to the demands of capital.”27  The indistinct blue slug “Izzy” served both as a cop out 
for developers who were still trying to figure out site plans and funding, while it attempted to 
play into the appeal of Atlanta as a hospitable place to everyone.  
 Rutheiser claims that the abandonment of the overall “Whatizit” concept was not an 
option after the negative press reception given that Payne himself chose this marketing 
8
24 Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 275.
25 Ibid., 254, 275; Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 246.
26 Ibid., 1; Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 275.  Rutheiser and Newman both 
suggest that Atlanta suffered from an identity crisis, therefore creating problems for ACOG in defining an Olympic 
image.
27 Ibid., 3.
platform.28  Both Payne and Young, however, seemed to understand that either the contradictions 
that existed within the Atlanta identity could enhance marketing opportunities and target 
audiences, or conversely, to settle on one theme runs the risk of alienating a segment of viewers.  
During the Games in 1996, Young contends that “Izzy” was a symbol of diversity and that “Izzy 
is breeding a new level of tolerance for things that look different from you and me.  It’s a weird 
little futuristic creature that you have to learn to love.”29  If ACOG and city planners decided to 
overtly embrace southern heritage as the image to portray, not only would this threaten the 
potential of corporate sponsorships but it would undermine the notion of internationalism and 
alienate a large percentage of tourists, resulting in decreased economic returns.  A more covert 
way to incorporate the complexities of Atlanta’s contradictory history and provide room for 
change in developing the sites was required.  The obscure nature of “Izzy” provides a perfect 
example of ACOG walking the tight-rope between the modern and nostalgic without fully giving 
in to either side.  
 While ambiguous in identity, the Games created a myth and hero to follow it through its 
marketing collateral.  In 1988, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution newspaper promoted the 
mythical plight of Billy Payne to convince Georgia and Atlanta politicians into bidding for the 
Games.  Mayor Young’s surprise in proclaiming Payne “a nut” at the notion appeared to 
perpetuate a myth of the unyielding spirit of this one man who recreated Atlanta into the 
international, modern city it had now become.30  This myth harks back to the nostalgic plight of 
Atlanta itself as a city that continued to redefine itself against all odds.  Atlanta Journal-
9
28 Ibid., 2.
29 “Mr. Olympics’ Still a Minister,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 22, 1996, SS:28.
30 Ed Hinton, “Payne’s Group Has Carried Torch for Atlanta in Run for Olympics,”  Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
April 24, 1988, D1:1. 
Constitution headlines and commentary link Atlanta to a “dark horse” and “underdog.”31  The 
media reported the story whereby Payne literally dreamed of the Olympic Games in Atlanta one 
night in 1987.32  In truth, former city leaders attempted to rally behind a bid for the 1984 
Olympic Games with the private sector, namely Coca-Cola, squelching these attempts.33  
Rutheiser notes that the support of Coca-Cola and Mayor Young enabled Payne and the AOC to 
pull this off, with the “symbolic capital” and international connections of Young crucial for 
support of this venture.34
 The truth, however, did not keep the myth of this former football star as an American 
hero from prospering.  In response to Atlanta’s nomination by the United States Olympic 
Committee (“USOC”) in January 1988, Payne was portrayed as an American pioneer.  A 
newspaper commentator associated Payne to the admirable, entrepreneurial American spirit, one 
who was the ideal American businessman who succeeded from “hard work and enterprise.”35  
Subsequent articles presented Payne with other prominent Atlantans.  An expose of Payne 
himself includes an endorsement from the regionally revered University of Georgia football 
coach, Vince Dooley, who compared Payne to a humble man of great fortitude.36  As a former 
longtime coach of the University of Georgia football team, Dooley himself was a Georgia icon 
10
31 “As Dark-horse Atlanta Pulls It Off, A Nutty Dream Approaches Reality,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 30, 
1988, A10:1; “Making the Pitch for ’96: IOC,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 16, 1988, E1:2.
32 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 228; Newman, Southern 
Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 253.
33 Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” 188; Whitelegg, 
“Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 805.  According to these sources, a negative feasibility study drafted by 
Research Atlanta in the 1970s based on the economic failures of the publicly-funded 1976 Montreal Olympics 
attributed to Coca-Cola’s lack of support to bid for the 1984 Olympics.  Subsequent “approval” by Coca-Cola to 
proceed with a bid for the 1996 Centennial Olympics was based on the success of the private sector’s involvement in 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.
34 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 229.
35 “A Boost for City’s Spirits,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, May 3, 1988, A18:1.
36 Ed Hinton, “Payne’s Group Has Carried Torch for Atlanta in Run for Olympics,”  Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
April 24, 1988, D20.
with loyal supporters.  The selling of the Olympic image to Georgians appeared to be through 
classic football themes that were tangible and persuasive to its audience - the image of the 
humble underdog, former football star, American idealist, with strong comparisons to another 
Georgia legacy. 
 The promotion of the Games turned the American hero Payne into a modern day 
apparition of Georgia’s own legacy, Martin Luther King, Jr.: “If you dream big enough, you 
never know what’s going to happen.  I have to believe we’re trying harder than any of the cities 
in the bid process.”  As chairman of the bid sponsor Georgia Amateur Athletic Foundation 
(GAFF), Billy Payne spoke these words the day before the USOC was scheduled to arrive in 
Atlanta for their 1988 evaluation.37  The use of the term ‘dream’ was made throughout the bid 
process, harking back to the famous speech made by Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1963 during the 
Civil Rights Movement.  Within the Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties (“ACOP”) 
Partnership Sales Circular, not only was King prominently represented but allusions to Payne as 
the modern day King were made.  Shown opposite to images of King was a description of 
Payne’s dream that Atlanta, and the American South, would host the 1996 Olympics.38  One 
questions whether Payne was to be considered the business elite version of King, brought 
forward with his dream to remove the downtown Atlanta core from its stagnation and bring 
prosperity to Atlanta corporate interests.    
 Rutheiser argues that Gone with the Wind represents the “real” Atlanta.  Although the city 
was not constructed by plantation culture, it survived as an “elite folk history, one that derives its 
11
37 “USOC coming to see the sights for Atlanta’s ’96 Olympic bid,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 4, 1988, 
D1:2.
38 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, The Unprecedented Opportunity of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic 
Games and the 1994 and 1996 U.S. Olympic Teams, 18.
‘truth’ not from its correspondence with the historical record...but from the collective, and highly 
selective, memory of a particular group.”39  In contrast to the assertion that planners dismissed 
the traditional southern heritage, the myth of Tara remained prevalent throughout the process 
from the moment the USOC arrived in Atlanta.  Just prior to the first visit by the USOC, the 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution coincidentally headlined a pitch to preserve Margaret Mitchell’s 
former house, dubbed “The Dump,” with Mayor Andrew Young finally agreeing to save the 
site.40  On the one hand, Atlantans and the African-American community preferred to move 
beyond the contemporary fiction of plantation life and slavery for the sake of a vision of 
integration.  Yet, Atlanta’s national and international identity was based in large part on this 
image as a draw for tourism so it paid to keep this myth in play.41  “The Dump” was eventually 
purchased and rehabbed by Games sponsor Daimler-Benz as a meeting facility for entertaining 
their guests in 1996, proof that social capital abroad existed within the myth of Gone with the 
Wind.42  The irony of Young as he vows to spare “The Dump” and not allow its demolition 
makes a statement signifying inter-racial harmony and moving beyond the past of slavery.  
Young, as a Civil Rights era icon who accepted the image of Tara, alluded to the world that the 
African-American community as a whole accepted this image and permitted city officials and 
Games planners the use of this lucrative marketing image without fear of stigma.
12
39 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 41.
40 “Mayor [Young] won’t allow razing of “Dump,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 26, 1988, A1:2.
41 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 45.
42 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 277.
“‘They bought it,’ Young says with a sly grin.”43
 During the events in 1996, Izzy the official mascot came and went with a flash, 
conspicuously missing and co-opted instead by an unofficial mascot - Scarlett O’Hara.  
Impersonator Melly Meadows was in such demand that numerous Scarlett impersonators were 
stationed throughout the sites at all times during the Games.44  While one wonders if in reality 
the dreaded Izzy was created to be intentionally loathsome so that the public would find Scarlett 
O’Hara more palatable, The Official Report of the Centennial Olympic Games published in 1997 
provides a different perspective.  Whereas the adult public disapproved of this icon, children 
adored it.  ACOP recreated the design to make it “more adaptable to licensed products and 
animation” for the sale to children, providing the opportunity to inculcate consumerism to the 
youngest citizens.45  The more obscure the message the better in the game of profiteering, for the 
power in ambiguity relies on its ability to adapt to the right audience. 
 Foreshadowing of what was to come can be seen during the Atlanta USOC presentations 
in 1988.  An article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution by Bud Simpson praised Atlanta’s public 
and private leaders for their focus on southern hospitality as the pre-eminent concern in the face 
of the presentation’s technical gaffs.46  When the Games finally arrived, the truth behind 
Atlanta’s claims would become apparent to the world through a frustrated stream of journalists, 
citizens, and IOC members.  Games planners placed considerable importance on image for the 
sake of logistics.47  The “advanced technology in transportation” promoted within ACOP 
13
43 “Mr. Olympics’ Still a Minister,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 22, 1996, SS:28.
44 Jim Auchmutey, “‘Scarlett’ Fever All the Rage at Games,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, July 27, 1996, SS42:1.
45 Ginger T. Watkins, ed., The Official Report of The Centennial Olympic Games: Planning and Organizing, Volume 
1 (Atlanta: Peachtree Publishers, 1997), 131.
46 Bud Simpson, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 6, 1988, A1:2.
47 Whitelegg, “Going for Gold:  Atlanta’s Bid for Fame,” 810.
sponsorship sales circulars proved a farce.48  Traffic congestion existed within normal work-
week days in Atlanta, so how could ACOG have overlooked the impact from the concentration of 
an additional 500,000 people within the Olympic ring areas?49  “Hell on wheels” was the 
moniker that the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported for the transportation system to the Lake 
Lanier venue, with buses behind schedule, breaking down and even getting lost.50  Transportation 
problems were so bad that spectators were delayed in making it to their scheduled events in time.  
On July 24th, five days into the Games, ACOG attempted “damage control” in response to 
negative press world wide and promised to refund money for individuals, namely journalists, 
who were late due to transportation delays.51
 In addition to debunking the idea of advanced transportation systems, journalists 
“regarded the Games too commercialized, and described Atlanta as a cheap carnival with so 
many vendors selling their wares to the public.”52  Reflecting unabashed commercialism, 
Centennial Olympic Park was created by ACOG, Coca-Cola and the State of Georgia (with City 
of Atlanta officials purposely excluded) to provide corporate sponsors the opportunity to market 
themselves.  Centennial Park was not based on any need relevant to the Games in athletic 
terms.53  City Council exercised its disdain for being excluded from Games planning in general, 
and from economic benefits derived from Centennial Olympic Park specifically, by offering 
deals to direct competitors of Games sponsors and selling commercial kiosks outside of the 
14
48 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, The Unprecedented Opportunity of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic 
Games and the 1994 and 1996 U.S. Olympic Teams, 14.
49 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 234.
50 “Extra,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 21, 1996, 15:1.
51 “ACOG Takes Damage-control Approach With Media,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 24, 1996, 22:4.
52 Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 277.
53 Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying, “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” 189.
Olympic mall of Centennial Olympic Park.   The tension and competition between ACOG and 
the Atlanta City Council for a voice in planning and gaining financial rewards came to a head.  In 
selling the Games to corporate sponsors, ACOG promised exclusivity and vowed to thwart 
ambush marketing tactics, yet they had no control over city properties outside of the established 
Games’ venues.  The city offered American Express the exclusive right to be the “official credit 
card of Atlanta,” much to the disdain of ACOG with Visa’s premier sponsorship of the Games.54  
City Council continued to challenge ACOG’s attempts to monopolize economic opportunities of 
the Games, creating an overload of commercialism with vendor kiosks throughout what became 
known as the Olympic “merchandise mall” of Centennial Olympic Park.55  
 As with many organizations, the framers often set the tone for the entire group.  The over-
indulgence in commercialism transpired into all aspects of the Games, from the venues and 
licensing rights to the athletes themselves.  Foreign athletes cashed-in on the money-making 
opportunities while some American consumers considered their purchases an act of charity for 
“less fortunate.”  Throughout the Games, athletes from around the world headed to a tent at the 
Varsity to sell t-shirts, uniforms, and free gifts received from corporate sponsors.  Dubbed a 
“garage sale,” many athletes “ran back to their rooms to see what items they could offer.”56  With 
the zeal of American exceptionalism, one consumer stated that “...meeting the athletes at the 
Varsity is more of what the Olympics are about, seeing people from other parts of the world, 
getting to hear their stories.  I feel sad for them.  They’ve worked so hard to get here and some of 
them go back to jobs making $80 a month.”57   
15
54 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 248.
55 Ibid., 272.
56 Al Levine, “Athletes Selling Shirts Off Own Backs,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 5, 1996, SS2:2.
57 Ibid.
 After the August 5th closing ceremonies, Juan Antonio Samaranch, president of the IOC, 
“declared the Atlanta Games great -- not the greatest -- but trounced the city’s zealous vending 
efforts and vowed that future Olympic committees would have control over their municipalities’ 
moneymaking schemes.”58  Although recognizing the need to fund the Olympics, Samaranch 
argued that the IOC and Olympic committees should maintain the power to do so.  Popular 
perception by Atlanta residents to this affront to “southern hospitality” was negative.  The next 
day, Atlanta Journal-Constitution journalist Colin Campbell addressed Samaranch’s comments 
as “tacky commercialism” unto itself, with the IOC, ACOG and City of Atlanta all pointing 
fingers at one another.59  Little did anyone realize what was to come in 1998.
“Bye-Bye, Olympese” - The 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Legacy
”The Disposable Olympics.” 60
16
58 “Great, But Not Greatest:  Samaranch: Commercial Efforts Must Be Limited,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
August 5, 1996, SS19:5.
59 Colin Campbell, “Bye-Bye, Olympese,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 6, 1996, C1:1.
60 Kerry Soper, “The Disposable Olympics,” Southern Spaces 18, no. 2 (Summer 1996): JPG file, http://
www.southernspaces.org/contents/2006/baker/1a-001-ss-06-zbaker.htm, (accessed April 29, 2009).
 Before his mayoral term ended, Young entitled ACOG with the authority to develop 
venues without input from City Council.61  Ironically, in 1992, this co-chair of ACOG and board 
member of the USOC stated “the Olympics were ‘not a welfare program, [they are] a business 
venture.  If they [the city government] wanted to be more involved they should’ve voted to pay 
their own expenses.”62  As such, the buying power of Dunwoody residents and the significant 
middle-class gay population provided the impetus for ACOG to react in favor of the citizens, 
whereas those with less ability to consume were marginalized.  This is evidenced by ACOG’s 
agreement to move the tennis venue to Stone Mountain amid angry resident protests from the 
original site in affluent Dunwoody.  ACOG also responded to controversy and was quick to move 
the volleyball venue away from Cobb County based on Cobb’s “family values” ordinance 
opposing gay and lesbian lifestyles.  Alternatively, ACOG proceeded with the construction of the 
Olympic Stadium in predominately poor Summerhill despite neighborhood resistance.63  The 
Olympic Villages on the former public housing complex Techwood Homes also proceeded 
without regard to resident displacement.  Why would ACOG refuse to respond to Summerhill 
and Techwood residents, predominately poor and African-American neighborhoods, whereas 
they act in the face of affluence and gay rights?  While it appears to be racially inspired on the 
surface, the reality is economics.  
 The poor African-American neighborhoods being displaced existed within the core of 
downtown Atlanta, in close proximity to the Olympic Village where athletes would be housed 
and other Olympic sites.  Additionally, Techwood Homes was near two esteemed Games 
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61 Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 237.
62 As quoted by Rutheiser, Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams, 238.
63 Newman, Southern Hospitality: Tourism and the Growth of Atlanta, 257.
planners, Coca-Cola and Georgia Tech.64  The process of the tenant displacement and demolition 
of public housing and neighborhoods such as Summerhill lacked in “southern hospitality.”  
While the result ultimately removed large concentrations of poverty and crime from the view of 
visitors to Atlanta, the opportunism that provided the impetus to break up this core of poverty did 
not actually provide resolve to the residents.  Within Techwood Homes and Clark-Howell 
Homes, the Atlanta Housing Authority demolished these complexes without a mechanism to 
assist those that were being displaced in finding housing.65  Furthermore, the poverty 
concentrations were merely transplanted to the southern suburbs, beyond areas of business or 
tourism.  
 It is important to note that the “manifestation of power and ideology” is reflected in “how 
urban public culture is defined and shaped by competition over the right to conceptualize, 
control, and experience public spaces.”66  Through a relationship between the State of Georgia 
and business elite, an image of public-private enterprise was maintained with those in public 
political positions who might serve as obstacles or opposing forces sidelined, as seen with the 
exclusion of the Atlanta City Council in overall planning.  By replacing “the citizen with the 
consumer as the focal point of urban public life,” the Games enabled Atlanta the opportunity and 
funding to make significant changes to the downtown infrastructure that were considered only 
dreams of many local business professionals and politicians for decades.67  Today, upscale high-
rise condos tower over Centennial Olympic Park with tourists running about the Georgia 
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65 Ibid., 291.
66 Mark Douglas Lowes, Indy Dreams and Urban Nightmares: Speed Merchants, Spectacle, and the Struggle over 
Public Space in the World-Class City (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 8.
67 Ibid, Preface xv.
Aquarium and shrine to Coca-Cola.  The lasting image of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Games 
among many academics and journalists predominately refers to over-commercialism and the 
process of victimization of the poor for the sake of profits.    
Conclusion
 Pierre de Coubertin’s founding of the Modern Olympic Movement in 1894 was based on 
his belief that “the pursuit of excellence so characteristic of athletic competition could help in the 
development of the whole person” and promoted sport in public education.68  What was created 
for the pursuit of personal excellence and in search of moral grounding has transpired into the 
pursuit of economics and a testament to social hierarchies.  In 1999, “the Salt Lake City scandal” 
surfaced, leading to U.S. Congressional Hearings on corruption charges against the IOC with 
regard to allegations of bribery in the Atlanta and Salt Lake City Olympic bid processes.  Payne 
and Young both attended these hearings, where Payne admitted to participating in “excessive 
actions, and even thought processes that today seem inappropriate.”69  Young confirmed the bid 
team “overextended ourselves with our Southern hospitality” toward individual IOC members, 
with gifts of university scholarships to the children of IOC members, luxury hotel stays and 
expensive goods.70  If the IOC were truly concerned with how the commodification of the 
Olympics was controlled by host cities, as mentioned by its 1996 president, maybe they should 
begin with establishing guidelines to combat the victimization of those who are citizens, not 
necessarily consumers, and avoid the encouragement of trumping ethics for profit.
19
68 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties, The Unprecedented Opportunity of the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic 
Games and the 1994 and 1996 U.S. Olympic Teams, 5.
69 Melissa Turner, “Payne: We Made Mistakes,”  Atlanta-Journal Constitution, October 15, 1999, A1 and A19.
70 Ibid.
 Unfortunately, alienation of the poor proves to be an overall Olympic legacy - Atlanta’s 
treatment of the poor was mild in comparison.71   One does not have to think hard to consider 
cities where cases of class marginalization occurred for the sake of the Olympics -- Seoul in 
1988 and, more recently, the 2008 Beijing Olympics are prime examples.  The economic 
implications of the policy where mega-events provide a viable solution to local development are 
often highlighted over any social and political consequences.72  The tale of the 1996 Atlanta 
Centennial Olympic Games reflects the tale of many cities with opportunism in the name of sport 
and the projected “spirit” of the Olympic Games applicable only to those at the apex of the social 
hierarchy, while poverty continues to oppress amid the prosperity of the Games. 
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